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Abstract 
This FEUTURE paper focuses on Turkey’s and Europe’s perceptions of each other in identity and cul-
tural terms between two periods: 1789-1922 and 1923-1945. It identifies the identity representa-
tions developed by both sides in response to key selected political and cultural drivers of these peri-
ods by subjecting the writings of prominent Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals in the first period 
as well as newspaper articles and editorials in Europe and Turkey in both periods to Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). Identity representations are then discussed in relation to the pre-identified focal is-
sues in the relationship; namely nationalism, status in international society, civilisation and state-
citizen relations. The paper finds that there is no linear pattern to identity representations that are 
constantly contested in both the Turkish and European contexts. Certain positive and negative events 
trigger identity representations in novel ways, feeding into a set of relations which can be identified 
by conflict, convergence or cooperation. 
 
FEUTURE projesi bağlamında hazırlanan bu makale, Türkiye ve Avrupa‘nın 1789-1922 ve 1923-1945 
dönemleri arasındaki birbirileri ile ilgili kimlik ve kültür algılarını irdelemektedir. Söz konusu olan ilk 
dönem için önde gelen Osmanlı bürokrat ve entellektüellerinin yazışmalarını, her iki dönem için ise 
Avrupa ve Türkiye gazetelerinde yer almış makaleleri Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) yöntemiyle ele 
alıp, her iki tarafın da geliştirdiği ve dönemlerin siyasi ve kültürel faktörlerine binaen seçilmiş kimlik 
tasvirlerini tespit etmektedir. Akabinde, elde edilen kimlik tasvirleri, daha önce tanımlanmış milli-
yetçilik, uluslararası toplumdaki konum, uygarlık ve devlet-vatandaş ilişkileri gibi odak meseleler 
ekseninde tartışılmaktadır. Makale içerisinde varılmış olan kanı, hem Türkiye hem de Avrupa bağlam-
larında sürekli olarak tartışılan kimlik tasvirlerinin doğrusal bir kalıba yerleştirilmesinin imkansız 
olduğudur. Bazı olumlu ve olumsuz olayların, çatışma, işbirliği ve uyum olarak tanımlanabilecek üç 
ilişki boyutunu yeni ve daima farklı yollarla besleyebileceği öngörülmektedir. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper focuses on Turkey’s and Europe’s perceptions of each other in identity and cultural terms 
between two specific periods, namely 1789-1922 and 1923-1945. The first period corresponds with 
the final centuries of the Ottoman Empire, in which key political developments took place in both the 
Ottoman Empire and Europe, shaping identity representations of each other on both sides. The sec-
ond period under analysis covers the initial decades after the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
in which rapid political and socio-cultural changes were undertaken in the country, which also wit-
nessed a turbulent period in European history leading up to the Second World War. The analyses 
presented below cover the identity representations incurred by the key political and cultural drivers 
of these periods. The concept of “driver” is used here in place of significant historical milestones that 
have influenced the relationship between Turkey and Europe and which have in turn shaped the 
mutual perceptions and representations in these given periods.  
Accordingly, for the first period of 1789-1922, the key political drivers around which substantive mu-
tual identity representations were observed and analysed are the proclamation of the Tanzimat Edict 
in the Ottoman Empire in 1839; the Reform Edict of 1856 and the Paris Conference; Sultan Abdülaz-
iz’s visit to Europe in 1866-1867 and the Paris World Fair of 1866; the Cretan insurrection of 1866-
1869; the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896; and the March 31 Revolt and Albülhamit’s deposition. 
For the second period of 1923-1945, the political drivers around which identity representations were 
observed and analysed are the Montreaux International Straits Convention of 1936 and Anchluss in 
1938, whereas the cultural drivers are the introduction of the Latin Alphabet in Turkey in 1928, a 
Turkish woman’s (Keriman Halis) victory in the Miss Universe competition in 1932 and the twelfth 
congress of the International Alliance for Women held in Istanbul in 1935.  
The selected texts over which identity representations were discerned included the writings of prom-
inent Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals in the first period as well as newspaper articles and edi-
torials in Europe and Turkey in both periods. These texts either explicitly or implicitly illustrated iden-
tity discussions on Turkey-EU relations and reflected the peculiarities of the periods under scrutiny. 
They were selected with reference to their temporal proximity and relevance to the chosen drivers. 
While we have had no problem finding press sources in British, French and German, particularly dur-
ing the nineteenth century, when press censorship in the Ottoman Empire suppressed evaluative 
discussions of domestic and/or international politics we have referred to alternative sources which 
include newspapers published by dissidents outside the Ottoman Empire in Ottoman Turkish as well 
as private letters, memoirs and memoranda written by prominent bureaucrats. All texts were read 
and analyzed in their original languages including Ottoman sources some of which were available in 
critical editions with transcriptions whereas the rest were transcribed into Latin by the researchers.1  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was used in tracing and identifying identity representations in the 
coverage of the drivers in the selected texts. CDA is a method that focuses on the study of relations 
                                                        
1 For more information on the methodology, case selection and the background literature which this research 
builds on, please see Aydın-Düzgit et. al. (2017), Deliverable 1- Literature Review and Guideline Paper: Identity 
and Culture Drivers. 
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between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains. Among the dif-
ferent approaches in CDA, we have adopted the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), which focuses 
particularly on analyzing the representations of identity and difference in discourse. The analytical 
apparatus in DHA consists of three main steps which were used in the empirical analysis of the se-
lected texts (Wodak 2001: 73). The first step involved outlining the main content of the themes and 
discourses, namely the discourse topics in the narrative on the relationship between Turkey and Eu-
rope. The second step involved the exploration of discursive strategies deployed in the construction 
of identities in the narrative. In this research, these discursive strategies were identified in respond-
ing to the following empirical questions directed at the texts (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 44): How are the 
chosen subjects (the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Europe, the EEC/EC/EU) named and referred to lin-
guistically? What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? By means of 
what arguments and argumentation schemes are certain representations of the subjects justified, 
legitimised and naturalised in discourse? Are the respective utterances intensified or mitigated? Dis-
cursive strategies often include argumentation strategies that are used in justifying attributions and 
that can take various forms. Among the most common is the employment of topos, defined as “parts 
of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises in the shape of 
content-related warrants that connect the arguments with the conclusion” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 
74). For example in the discursive construction of national identities, one often encounters the topos 
of culture and history. The third step of analysis then explored the linguistic means that are used to 
realise these discursive strategies.  
The results are discussed below in relation to selected focal issues, namely the issues with respect to 
which Europe (or Turkey) constitutes its identity by comparing itself with and/or differentiating itself 
from its significant Other, i.e. Turkey (or Europe). The four focal issues identified are nationalism, 
civilization, status in international society, and state-citizen relations.2            
2. 1789-1922 Period 
2.1. Proclamation of Tanzimat: Imperial Edict of 1839 
Imperial Edict of Gülhane (Tanzimat Fermanı), proclaimed in the Gülhane Park on November 3rd 
1839 in Constantinople, is both a major step towards the reformulation of state-citizen relations in 
the Ottoman Empire and an appeal to European standards of civilization in an effort to gain better 
status in international society. The Gülhane Edict sought to address widespread grievances among 
the Ottoman subjects, by promising security of life and property, due process of law, universal justice 
regardless of religion or sect, fair adjustment of military conscription and fair taxation policies. The 
Edict also entailed a move to win the general favour of European states in the ongoing crisis with 
Egyptian governor Mehmet Ali Pasha who seriously threatened Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt and 
Syria. Failing to stop the military advances of Mehmet Ali Pasha, Ottoman state had to resort to Rus-
sian assistance first and to the mediation of European states later in order to protect itself. The Edict 
also invoked the European states as witnesses to the Ottoman Sultan’s promises to its own subjects. 
                                                        
2
 For more information on the identification and significance of the focal issues, please see Ibid. 
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The Ottoman texts on the Tanzimat Edict mark the first time the word civilization (medeniyet) is used 
in the Ottoman language (1839O1, 183902). The Ottoman neologism for civilization, medeniyet, was 
derived from the Arabic word medine which, in its various forms, signified urban culture and civility 
as opposed to nomadism (Wigen 2015). Through such a translation a convergence between Ottoman 
social and political categories and the European key concept of civilization occurred. In these texts 
civilisation is how Europeans conduct their affairs among themselves and what makes them superior 
and victorious, it is not presented as an essentialised category, unique to Europeans. For one text it is 
a product of reverence for knowledge transferred from other cultures and of hard work (1839O1); 
for another it follows from reverence to human nature (1839O2). It is associated primarily with tech-
nology (understood as practical science and knowledge and their dissemination) and second, as a 
problem of politics and morality.  
Many European sources present the promulgation of the Edict as a historical step towards civilization 
(1839G2, 1839F1). Although there seems to be some hesitation regarding the sincerity of the Otto-
man Empire in its pledge due to its former notoriety as a despotic and oppressive govern-
ment(1839E2), European newspapers do not seem to take an essentialized or cultural view of civiliza-
tion either; they consider it transferable. However, the idea of European exceptionalism and the 
signs of the mission civilatrice are apparent in arguments that it is by the help of Europe that the East 
will embrace fundamental values of humanity (1939F1). 
One Ottoman source characterizes the European state system as a state of perpetual peace 
(1839O2). The Egyptian crisis motivates the Empire to become part of this system which provides 
security and arbitration to its members and the summoning of the “friendly states” of Europe as wit-
nesses in the Edict (1839O3) indicates openness to surrender the Empire’s sovereignty at least sym-
bolically to international oversight.  European sources are somewhat silent on the implications of the 
Edict regarding Ottoman accession to European system; however, their consideration and commen-
dation of the Edict as a constitution in European standards can be interpreted as a willingness to 
judge the Empire by the standards of Europe.  
State-citizen relations are the most central issue to the Edict since the core of the Edict is the refor-
mulation of the relationship between the Ottoman state and its subjects in a just and fair fashion 
with attention to certain universal standards (1839O3). Both European and Ottoman sources equate 
provision of fundamental rights and securities to subjects with universal moral standards and the 
proper direction of Ottoman reform. The promise of universal application of security of life, property 
and taxation appealed both to Ottoman subjects who had been left politically and economically des-
titute due to oppressive restorationist policies of Mahmud II and also to European powers who were 
concerned about the rights and conditions of the particularly Christian minorities in the Empire 
(1839G1). 
 
2.2. Reform Edict of 1856 and Paris Conference 
The 1856 Paris Treaty concluded the 1853-56 Crimean War between the Russian and the Ottoman 
Empire. In order to maintain the “balance of powers” established in Vienna Congress (1815) and to 
contain Russia, England and France allied with the Ottoman Empire.  The Paris Treaty officially recog-
nized the Ottoman Empire as a member of the European state system and guaranteed her territorial 
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integrity. A month before the conference, on February 18 1856, Ottoman Empire proclaimed the 
Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı) with the intention of winning the favour of European powers and 
leaving the coming conference with a better deal. The Edict was primarily concerned with the im-
provement of the conditions of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire and it promised legal and 
status equality and greater autonomy and freedom to all the religious communities subject to Otto-
man state.  
The Crimean war led to an unprecedented amount of European presence in Istanbul and heightened 
interest in European culture, practices and fashion. Below, European and Ottoman representations 
of four successive events representing the heightened political and cultural interactions in this period 
are analysed: 1) the bestowal of the Ordre national de la Légion d'honneur to the Sultan by the 
French ambassador in December 1855, marking the first time that a Sultan received a Christian or-
der; 2) Sultan Abdulmecid’s attendance to the annual ball held by the British ambassador on Febru-
ary 1, 1856, marking the first time an Ottoman Emperor to attend an event in European style; 3) the 
declaration of Reform Edict; 4)the signing of Paris Treaty on March 30, 1856. During and after the 
peace talks there was a constant struggle between England and France for influence on Ottoman 
policy and Ottoman bureaucrats were also split into factions according to their European alliances.  
In European sources, the willingness of the Ottoman sultan to partake in European entertainments 
and the granting of political rights to Ottoman Christians in the Reform Edict are taken as sure sign of 
civilization(1856E2, 1856F1). While some European texts have a more accommodating and refined 
approach to Ottoman culture and identity (1856F1, 1856G2), others seem to be more cynical and 
orientalising in their depiction of Ottoman adoption of European practise (1856E2). Ottoman 
sources, on the other hand, choose to dwell on the tension created by the Empire’s growing political 
and cultural interaction with Europe. This tension is reflected particularly in criticism of changing 
consumption patterns and gender relations. The fact that the Sultan’s receiving the order of Legion 
d’honneur is not mentioned in Ottoman sources can be taken as a sign of reaction to the diminishing 
power of the Empire among civilizations and the fear of being too much associated with Europe. 
While both Ottomans and Europeans use civilization in the singular, Ottoman texts also reveal a ten-
sion between “the civilization” and Ottoman traditions (1856O3).   
Status of Ottoman Empire in the international society of Europe is the key topic of the period. The 
establishment of Russia as a common enemy and the need to secure peace in Europe facilitates the 
admission of Ottoman Empire into Europe on equal footing with the major powers. However, the 
inclusion of the political rights of non-Muslims as an article in the treaty leads to concerns on the 
Ottoman side. Aside from the Pashas who push the Edict into effect, most of the Ottoman bureau-
crats seem to take this as a sure sign of creeping European intervention in what should be the do-
mestic affairs of the Empire (1856O1, 1856O2). This later turns into a cleavage within Ottoman bu-
reaucracy whereby certain cliques would accuse others of over-Westernization. Thus admission of 
Ottoman Empire into international society is born with a constant tension emanating from the threat 
of intervention and loss of sovereignty.  
Concerning state-citizen relations, the inclusion of the political rights of the non-Muslim subjects as a 
clause in the draft of treaty is significant. European texts perceive it as a criteria of civilization that 
Ottoman Empire grants universal rights to all its subjects although they are obviously aware of the 
sensitivity and the intricacy of the issue (1856E1). That the matter of conscription is brought up by a 
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European text demonstrates this sensitivity since the near exclusivity of conscription to Muslim 
population from 1830s onwards had seriously weakened Muslims materially. Although the Empire 
attempted to devise ways of including non-Muslims in the army, she could not trust non-Muslims 
enough and the non-Muslim communities did not want military service either. While Ottoman texts 
are aware of the necessity of reform regarding the non-Muslims, the way the issue is forced in inter-
national arena through a treatise and later hurried into Ottoman policy through the Edict creates 
resentment (1856O1, 1856O2). Muslim identity of the Empire resurfaces as a key issue at this point. 
The negative image of the Reform Edict taints the image of the government and also spreads suspi-
cion regarding the direction of the reform process overall, which is evident in the ironic use of the 
“way of civilization” by one text (1856O3).   
 
2.3. Abdulaziz’s Visit to Europe and Paris World Fair of 1866 
Sultan Abdülaziz was the only Ottoman emperor who made a peaceful journey outside the Ottoman 
realms. In order to enhance the relationships between the empire and European countries after the 
Paris Conference, he travelled to Paris to attend the Paris Exposition upon the invitation of Napoleon 
III, and then to England, Brussels, and Vienna between June 21 and August 7, 1867.  The visit was 
covered extensively in European and Ottoman Press. 
All the sources from the European context report very positively on the sultan’s visits and show the 
greatest interest for the sultan’s personality, demeanor and charisma. With regard to the focal issue 
of civilization, European sources highlight how the appearance of the Sultan in Europe has challenged 
the image of the Muslim ruler as oriental and exotic (1867G2, 1867E1). The familiarity of Abdülaziz 
with European ways and his modest and simple attire are seen as signs of a civilizational closeness 
between the Turks and the respective European country or Europe as whole (1867E1, 1867F1). Most-
ly, Europe is described homogenously, but not as superior. One German text even assumes an up-
coming civilizational lead of the Ottoman Empire in comparison to the Habsburg monarchy by guar-
anteeing its subjects freedom of religion, referring to the Reform Edict of 1856(1867G2). While the 
issue of Ottoman political reforms is only occasionally brought up in European accounts of the visit, 
European attitude towards Ottoman political progress and reform process are quite favorable and 
optimistic(1867G2).  
On the other hand, status in international society and state society relations are decidedly central to 
Ottoman accounts of the visit (1867O1). The visit is expected to benefit the Empire materially 
(1867O1; 1867O2, 1867O3). The gap between Europe and the Empire in order and prosperity is high-
lighted through the visit and the Sultan himself, impressed by his observations, promises to improve 
his image in the eyes of his subjects through development of the realms (1867O3). The interpreta-
tions of the visit fit the familiar pattern whereby Europe sets a standard of political, social and eco-
nomic development for Ottoman Empire to follow and embrace as a goal of its own reform program. 
The fact that such demands are implicitly made in Ottoman newspapers using the minority languages 
in the Empire (Armenian for instance) (1867O1), which are then translated and quoted in a newspa-
per published in Turkish is also revealing, since it reflects a dissatisfaction shared by both Muslim and 
non-Muslim subjects. 
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In spite of the Cretan Insurrection that was going on during the Exposition and the Sultan’s visit Ot-
toman Empire seems to have a favorable status in international society at the time. The invitation by 
Napoleon, the English Queen and hospitality of the other nations which hosted the Sultan were signs 
of further improvement of relations improving after the Paris Conference. Ottoman sources recog-
nize the significance of the invitation of Napoleon alongside other European rulers and politicians 
(1867O2). On the European side, there is reason to suppose that the favorable image created by the 
visit helped the resolution of the Cretan Insurrection and the Ottoman-Greek conflict in favor of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
 
2.4. Cretan Insurrection of 1866-1869 
The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-69 began in August 1866 with the Cretan rebels aiming to annex the 
island to Greek rule by attracting the attention of the international public to the maladministration of 
Ottoman government and possibly provoking an intervention by the major powers. The insurrection 
escalated into a confrontation between Ottoman Empire and Greece and finally resolved in favor of 
Ottoman government in January 1869 with a prompt conference in Paris. The three-year crisis was 
the first major diplomatic event after the Crimean War and Paris Conference which secured the terri-
torial integrity of the Ottoman Empire under the auspices of the European Concert and as such it was 
a test of faith for both the Ottoman Empire and European powers regarding their mutual promises to 
uphold their parts of the bargain. In the Ottoman Empire, the Cretan Insurrection coincided with the 
rise of the Young Ottomans, a group of mid rank bureaucrats who both challenged the direction of 
Ottoman modernization by advocating popular representation and accountability and also preaching 
proto-nationalist ideas.  
With regards to the issue of “status in international society”, the British texts describe the relation-
ship between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire as a balanced partnership of equals 
(1869E1, 1869E2).  The German articles depict Europe as homogeneous and exclude Greece (1869G1, 
1869G2).  While also not included in Europe, the Ottoman Empire’s status in the international society 
is considered to be important since its territorial integrity has a lasting effect on the well-being of 
whole Europe (1869E1, 1869F1). Hence facilitating a peaceful and stable order on the continent re-
quires containing the insurrection in Crete. Intriguingly, the European newspapers do not invoke 
civilizational issues very often. The comparison with the rebellious Greeks and unruly Greek insur-
gents helps strengthen the perception that Turks are civilized. British newspaper articles particularly 
praise the scientific skills used by the Ottoman troops in order to oppress the insurrection(1869E2). 
The issues of nationalism and state-society relations are also absent in European coverage of the 
Insurrection; the threat of an escalating conflict and the desire for international peace seem to trump 
the segregationist and nationalist goals of Cretan insurgents and demands of Greek government. 
Cretan insurgents are downplayed against obedient Greeks who ally themselves with Ottoman ad-
ministration.  
Ottoman newspapers acknowledge the role of major European states as leader of the international 
arena and arbitrators of conflict in the East. Ottoman sources also note that the Great Powers want 
the security and stability of the Ottoman Empire (1868O4) and acknowledge the power of interna-
tional law in protecting Ottoman interests (1869O8). Concerning the focal issue of “civilization”, Ot-
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toman writers see themselves as part of the civilized world, while noting the prevalent negative im-
age of the Turk in Europe as cruel and barbarous Muslims who torture Christians (1868O1, 1869O7). 
Ottoman pro-government newspapers also evades the issue of nationalism and its implications for 
Ottoman society and presents the Insurrection as simply a conflict between Ottoman and Greek 
states: the Ottoman government has done nothing wrong by the Cretans and it is only the misplaced 
nationalist sentiments of some Greeks that motivate revolt (1869O7). 
The Cretan Insurrection was a major reference point for the Young Ottomans in their opposition to 
Ottoman Government. Opposition writers explicitly articulate their admiration for the just and repre-
sentative governments of European countries (1868O2, 1868O3) and lament the maladministration 
of the Ottoman government, which in their view is what keeps the Ottoman Empire from becoming 
an important player in power politics (1868O4). They attribute the negative image of the Turk in Eu-
rope to the ignorance of European public which is exacerbated by the equally ignorant Ottoman gov-
ernment. The opposition newspapers also strongly advocate an Ottoman national identity, Ottoman-
ism which will embrace religious and ethnic differences under the banner of loyalty to the Ottoman 
state (1868O1). Presenting the Cretan issue as a consequence of Ottoman maladministration, Young 
Ottomans argue that parliamentary representation will allow each Ottoman community to voice 
their interests in Istanbul and eliminate the rise of separatist demands (1868O1).  
 
2.5. The Hamidian Massacres of 1894-1896 
The Hamidian massacres, named after Sultan Abdul Hamid II, refer to the acts of violence that were 
inflicted on the Armenian population in the years 1894–1896. Provoked by the events, Britain, 
France, and Russia worked out a “Project of Reforms for the Eastern Provinces of Asia Minor” and 
presented them to the Porte on May 11, 1895. However, the Sultan refused to implement these re-
forms which were to guarantee the Armenians better protection. The events of the Hamidian massa-
cres have been considered as a prelude to the systematic persecution of the Armenian population 
which later became known as the Armenian genocide of 1915. 
The Issue of civilization seems central to both European and Ottoman texts. Most of the European 
texts use a particularly graphic language in their description of the massacres, blame the despotism 
of the Ottoman sultan and the government, religious fanaticism of the Muslim clergy and the savage 
behavior of the Kurdish rabble(1894E1, 1894G1, 1894G2, 1894F1). Along with this morally charged 
language, European texts also dominantly emphasize religious identity as a major distinction be-
tween the Empire and Europe. Some explicitly mark Europe as the monde civilisé which again leaves 
out Ottoman Empire out as the uncivil.  
With the exception of one European text, which grants the Ottoman government right to discipline 
its subjects, European texts do not see the issue as a case of respecting international law. Some Eu-
ropean texts blame the European powers with being involved in Armenian issue simply out of geo-
political concerns without genuine regard for humanity (1894F1), which implies that the Armenian 
issue is seen a mainly humanitarian problem, which, in turn, reinforces the civilizational aspect. One 
text presents the situation as a choice between the better despot, between Russian and the Ottoman 
Empire (1894G2).  
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In Ottoman sources, both pro-government and opposition newspapers consider it the Empire’s legal 
right to discipline its unruly subjects by military action by international standards (1896O3, 1896O6). 
The pro-government texts present the situation as a problem of unruly citizens (both Kurds and Ar-
menians) (1896O6), and criticize the impulsive behaviour of Muslim population and particularly 
Kurds against Armenians, and massacre of civilian population by other civilians as uncivil. This is jux-
taposed with the Ottoman army’s possible official action against unruly Armenians. Ottoman opposi-
tion newspaper also portray the Ottoman people as civilized yet blame the oppressive sultan in addi-
tion to the rebellious Armenians in the matter (1895O2).  Pro-government Ottoman texts reveal a 
concern with protecting the civilized image of the Ottoman Empire as the sole Muslim state and na-
tion in a world of Christian states (1896O6: 45-46).  Opposition texts argue that a case of Ottoman 
maladministration and seditious Armenian revolutionaries is presented in Europe as a case of purely 
religious violence and oppression (1896O4). One text accuses the British of betraying their own civili-
zation by defending the cause of Christianity and not humanity (1895O2).  
Ottoman opposition newspaper criticizes the Ottoman Sultan for not fulfilling the pledges made in 
the Tanzimat and Reform Edicts to reform state-citizen relations (1895O1). They rule out any option 
of independence for Armenians or other non-Muslim subjects, and instead advise all Ottoman citi-
zens to stand united against the oppressive government (1896O6). Pro-government texts on the oth-
er hand adopt a mostly traditional approach to state-citizen relations as a ruler-subject relation, they 
invoke past-Ottoman practices to emphasize the government’s right to discipline its unruly subjects 
and advise obedience to the Sultan and seeking refuge in his compassion (1896O6 35-36).  
Both pro-government and opposition texts, however, emphasize the primacy of the Muslim people 
among ottoman subjects: opposition texts as more of a case of primus inter pares whereas pro-
government texts as a case of Muslim dominant country. The frequent use of the word Turk and 
Turkiye particularly in opposition texts reveal the emergence of a partial ethnic consciousness among 
younger generation of Ottoman elite, or rather the gradual identification of Ottoman identity with a 
proto-concept of Turkishness, which is not necessarily differentiated from Islam (1895O2, 1896O4, 
1896O5). 
European sources also criticize the Sultan for gradually abolished almost every right and privilege 
that was guaranteed by the Reform Edict of 1856 (1895E1). Most articles also lament the non-
implementation of the decisions taken at the Berlin Congress 1878, which would improve the securi-
ty and legal situation of Armenians (1894G2). According to European texts, the Ottoman government 
not only reduced the rights of the Christian population of the Empire but also made people believe 
that Armenians are at war with Islam and England is the chief enemy of Turkey (1895E1). 
 
2.6. March 31 Revolt and Abdulhamid’s Deposition 
In July 23 1908 Sultan Abdulhamid II caved in to the pressures of the Committee of Union and Pro-
gress (a group of bureaucrats and military officers campaigning for constitutional government, -
henceforth CUP-) and reinstituted the constitution (Kanun-ı Esasi) which he had suspended 30 years 
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earlier. On April 13, 19093, a group of unranked soldiers from the standing army in Istanbul and 
some conservative religious groups, which criticized CUP, revolted and took control of the city. The 
parliament reconvened the same day and unanimously deposed Abdulhamid, accusing him of plot-
ting the revolt. Mehmed V Reşad (1844 –1918) ascended the throne. On April 14, one day after the 
events in Istanbul, a major unrest emerged in Adana and around 15-30 thousand Armenians were 
massacred by Muslim civilians.  
Many European sources characterize the conceding Sultan as despotic cruel (1909E1, 1909G1), who 
was neither the right person to prevent the Ottoman empire from falling apart nor a good partner for 
the Western powers (1909F2). It is noted that Abdülhamid’s pervasive fear made him lock himself in 
Yıldız Palace with informants and spies, and thus he was unable to create harmonic stability amongst 
the various peoples in the pluricultural empire and approximate the Ottoman Empire to the “occi-
dental civilization” (1909F2). Most of the European sources seem to be optimistic with regards to the 
newly appointed Mehmed V, emphasizing that he wants to govern in accordance with the reintro-
duced constitution (1909G2) and supports the idea of liberty (1909F1). However, many articles also 
point out that the Young Turks want a Sultan they can control, and that this Sultan was favoured by 
the Young Turks because of his tractable character (1909G2). The increasingly autocratic style of the 
Young Turks is implied and depicted as dangerous for the maintenance of peace in the country 
(1909G1). 
In the Ottoman context both the opposition party and the pro-CUP press try to factor in a universal 
standard. The opposition emphasizes civilization and considers it as a standard which the 
East/Muslims already have (1909O1, 1909O2, 1909O3, 1909O4). One opposition newspaper distin-
guishes between the immoral practices of Europe and its material/economic achievements and 
shuns the former while adopting the latter (1909O1, 1909O2) and associates the West prominently 
with Christian consciousness (1909O2). Another opposition newspapers associates the East with Is-
lam and considers it to be in possession of freedom and constitutional government since ancient 
times (1909O4). All opposition texts imagine a future where the nation will develop depending on its 
own indigenous values and become an example to the whole world in civilization (1909O2, 1909O4). 
Pro-CUP press on the other hand consider the opposition as reactionaries and suppression of the 
revolt is presented as a win for freedom and progress (1909O5, 1909O6).  
With the regards to the focal issue of state-citizen relations, British articles refer to the Hamidian 
massacres and argue that the sultan’s fear of dissidents were responsible for the terrible atrocities 
which had marked his reign (1909E1,1909E2). The conceding sultan “fostered and connived at the 
internecine feuds of race and creed amongst his subjects” (1909E1). Although the massacres of the 
Armenians and the bloodshed in Macedonia attracted attention in Europe, “no race suffered more 
cruelly and more constantly at his hands than the Turks themselves” (1909E1).  Another article criti-
cally remarks that by fostering pan-Islamic ideas, and showing himself as the successor of the proph-
et and thus spiritual leader of Islam, Abdulhamit had a negative impact on the non-Muslim popula-
tion (1909G1) and endangered the peace in some of the empire’s provinces. 
                                                        
3 The revolt is known as the March 31 affair (according to the Ottoman Gregorian calendar). 
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The relation between the state and the citizens is a central topic in the Ottoman press as both sides 
accuse each other of oppression, injustice, illegitimate motivations and betraying the national inter-
ests. The fact that both sides use the vocabulary of freedom, popular legitimacy and constitutional-
ism reveal the degree to which universal political standards had been embraced in the Empire. The 
opposition accuse CUP to be a secretive organization, simply another tool of oppression and a dis-
grace to the constitution they are supposed to uphold (1909O1, 1909O3). Pro-CUP newspapers pre-
sent Abdulhamid as a bloodthirsty and selfish tyrant who oppressed its own people; the insurgents 
are argued to be an extension of his oppression and supporters are claimed to not have embraced 
freedom and progress (1909O5, 1909O6).  
Opposition and pro-CUP sources also diverge in the focal issue of nationalism. Opposition sources 
place great emphasis on religion and state and their union as indispensable to Ottoman identity 
(1909O1, 1909O3) and implicitly accuse CUP of subverting these values and not respecting Sharia. 
The pro-CUP sources avoid the issue of religion, although they cite the providence of God as a reason 
in their victory (1909O5, 1909O6). Both the opposition and the CUP sources glorify the army as the 
embodiment of the nation, which reveals the militaristic aspect of the emerging national identity. 
3. 1923-1945 Period 
3.1. Abolition of the Caliphate (3 March 1924) 
Following the abolition of the Sultanate in 1 November 1922, first the religious powers of the Sultan 
passed over to his cousin Abdul Medjid Efendi who acted as the new Caliphate with no political au-
thority. However, his term as Caliph proved short-lived, and the Caliphate was also abolished on 3 
March 1924. The abolishment of Caliphate is one of the most striking reforms the new Republic in-
troduced to secularize the state structure and contain the role of Islam in Turkish society (Ayata 
1996: 41-42).   
The European press covered the abolition of the Caliphate intensively, and while doing so highlighted 
the duality and incommensurability of Western and Oriental civilizations. 1924E1views the abolition 
of caliphate as Turkey’s attempt to move from the East to the West. It stresses Turkey’s action as 
“the deliberate renunciation of whatever spiritual and, by consequence, political precedency Turkey 
enjoyed in the Moslem world”, for the sake of “the reconstruction of Turkey as a compact national 
unit on the Western pattern”. 1924F3 emphasizes that a hybrid system comprising both Oriental and 
Western features is not sustainable, since they are incompatible; the former is based on religious 
ideas, while the latter is guided by the secular modernity of the Twentieth Century. Therefore, the 
secular reforms of Turkey saying a definite goodbye to the Orient are necessary. While noting their 
different reactions to the abolishment of the caliphate, 1924G2 underscores that the transition to 
the new capital city Angora from the former imperial capital city Constantinople also marks the shift 
from one civilizational paradigm to another.  
European texts also share the concern that the abolition of the Caliphate will lead to divisions within 
the Islamic Civilization and a competition to claim the seat of the Caliphate vacated by the Turks 
(1924E1; 1924F1; 1924F2; 1924E2; 1924E3; 1924E4; 1924E5; 1924G2). According to 1924F1, the lack 
of a religious leader for the Muslim world will be a crucial problem for the stability of the region. 
According to 1924F2, the Islamic world is already divided since subjects in each country pray for their 
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own Sultans as their religious leaders. Similarly, 1924G2 points out the possibility of several caliphs in 
the Muslim World as it is not certain, who will succeed the disposed caliph Abdülmecid.  
There is a marked difference between the English texts, and the French and German texts, since the 
English considers “the abolition of the Caliphate” as a status loss for Turkey in the international mi-
lieu, while the French and the German are mostly appreciative of the reform that proves Turkey’s 
westernization. Some degree of nostalgia is evident in English texts, with 1924E5 highlighting the 
Caliphate as a symbol of Islamic civilization and 1924E3 emphasizing the splendor of the Islamic civili-
zation during the dark ages of Europe. 1924E1 points out that the dismantlement of the Caliphate 
will result in a status loss for Constantinople/Istanbul “from the Rome of the East …to a cosmopolitan 
city of provincial status”. 1924E5 warns that dismantling “an institution so venerable from one of the 
greatest religions of the world” will have dire consequences for Turkey. 1924E4 and 1924E5 remind 
that Indian Muslims had marshalled support for Kemalists against the British in the independence 
war by introducing them as the defenders of Islam.  
The French texts, on the other hand, mostly consider the abolition of the Caliphate as a great 
achievement for Turkey’s Westernization, while only a minority focuses on the dire consequences 
Turkey will face in the Muslim world (1924F2). According to 1924F3, the abolition of the Caliphate 
puts an “end to the dream of pan-Islamic imperialism”, and “the Turkish Republic certainly accom-
plished the greatest moral and intellectual liberation that the Muslims ever achieved”. 1924F5 prais-
es the reform along with other secular reforms as “a true revolution in political, religious and societal 
institutions of the Turkish state”. The only exception is 1924F2 arguing that the abolition of the Ca-
liph is like the abolition of the Pope which is unthinkable. Similarly, 1924G1 welcomes the abolition 
of the caliphate as a milestone that will pave the way for Turkey’s modern development based on the 
model of Europe. The text also claims that since the caliphate had an “universal character” it by its 
mere existence involved Turkey in certain foreign policy obligations.   
In both Turkish texts (1924O1, 1924O2), abolition of the caliphate and the dismissal of the Ottoman 
dynasty from Turkey is presented as a final step in the transfer of sovereignty from the usurper dy-
nastic family to the Turkish people. The dynastic family and the caliphate are presented as obsolete 
institutions and accused of both causing the decline of Islam (1924O1) and collaborating with the 
enemies of the Turkish nation (1924O2). Curiously, justification of abolition is not done with refer-
ence to principle of secularism or to the example of European civilization but to the Islamic tradition. 
Especially, 1924O1 goes to great lengths to prove the caliphate un-Islamic in its current form and 
considers the Turkish nation the most successful of Muslim peoples.  In Turkish texts, the nation is 
defined in relation to its enemies; ranging from the Greeks and the British to the dynastic family 
which is argued to be the accomplices of the former (1924O2). In 1924O1, the nation is defined in 
relation to its negative past which is manifest in the Ottoman dynasty.  
 
3.2. The Introduction of Latin Alphabet (1 November 1928) 
The alphabet reform stands as a crucial watershed in the history of Turkish Republic officially endors-
ing the pro-Western outlook of Turkey and its rigorous detachment from the Orient.  Low literacy 
rate, hovering around 10% when the Republic was formed, was considered as a crucial impediment 
to the modernization of Turkey, and subsequently a language commission composed of prominent 
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Turkish writers including Falih Rıfkı Atay was formed to adapt Turkish language to Latin scripts. The 
law accepting the new alphabet passed the parliament in 1 November 1928 urging for a complete 
shift to Latin alphabet in all walks of life by 1 December 1928.  
The adoption of Latin alphabet produced intensive “civilization” discussions in both European and 
Turkish texts. 1928E1 identifies two distinct and mutually exclusive civilizations, European (modern 
and scientific) vs Oriental (backward) and argues that the Latin alphabet reform constitutes the final 
step for Turkey to detach from “the old Oriental culture” and assimilate into the “European civiliza-
tion”. While stressing that Turkey is essentially different from Arabs and Persian, the European texts 
remain persistent in their perception of Turkey as an Oriental country. At the same time, some texts 
reveal their discontent with the alphabet reform which not only offends religious Europeans 
(1928E3), but also undermines the incompatibility between Turkish (Oriental) and Latin (Western) 
languages (1928F4).   
Different from the European texts, the Turkish texts identify a single civilization referring to the 
West/Europe and dismiss the Orient, Arabs and Persia, as a source of backwardness. In 1928T4, 
Yunus Nadi depicts the West (Garb) as the “true civilization” nurtured by science. He claims that until 
recently the Orient was considered and celebrated as an “Oriental and Islamic civilization” as if it was 
worthy of such an honor: “Arabs were only able to represent civilization briefly when they temporari-
ly adopted the Hellenic science” (1928T4). 
Alphabet reform is viewed by all Turkish texts as a facilitator for Turkey’s efforts to join (Western) 
civilization. In 1928T3, Yunus Nadi claims that, thanks to the alphabet reform, Turkey will be able to 
retrieve "the true key of civilization” in less than a year, and thus it will "completely resemble Eu-
rope". Dismissing the Arabic scripts as the main source of Turkey’s backwards for many years, 1928T2 
considers the adoption of Latin alphabet as a step towards “high humanity”. 1928T1emphasizes that 
civilization is not reserved for a privileged few, but can be understood and embraced by everybody 
(from intellectuals to shepherds) through a common alphabet. Alphabet revolution will help achieve 
the mental unity of Turkish nation, and anchor it to civilization, by enabling both lower and upper 
classes to speak the same language (1928T1) and use their brain (1928T2). 1928T1 urges Turkey to 
hurry in its reforms since civilization gets rid of the ones who cannot keep up with it.  
On the theme of state-citizen relations, the European texts choose to highlight the forceful execution 
of the alphabet reform through prescribing “severe penalties” to those who oppose the reform 
(1928E4). 1928F4 depicts it as an arbitrary imposition undermining cultural diversity and questions 
how “the grand public” can be imposed a uniform script disregarding local dialectical differences. The 
German texts also focus on the compulsory nature of the alphabet reform and its “hasty and violent” 
execution under the instructions of the “enlightened dictatorship” (1928G1; 1928G2). However, 
1928E4 admits that Ataturk’s “hard-handed” reform is working due to established Turkish culture 
that gives “the highest admiration and trust” on “the stern ruler”. 1928F2 claims that since 80% of 
the population still cannot read the new alphabet, they cannot follow and object to governmental 
decisions. On the other hand, 1928G1 claims that eventually the reform will bring an economic, polit-
ical, and social change that will eventually overthrow the Ataturk’s “dictatorship”. 
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3.3. Keriman Halis’ Miss Universe victory (1 August 1932) 
Through the initiative of the pro-government “Cumhuriyet” daily, Turkey started to send female con-
testants to international beauty contests abroad in 1928. The Miss Universe beauty contest in the 
city of Spa, Belgium on 1 August 1932 resulted in the victory of Keriman Halis, the 19 year old grand 
daughter of the Sheikh-ul Islam of the last Ottoman Sultan. Her victory was celebrated as a national 
achievement certifying the Western/European credentials of Turkey as well as the nobility of the 
Turkish race. 
The European texts implicitly point to a single civilization composed of the West/Europe and some 
consider the case of Keriman Halis as a confirmation of Turkey’s admission to this civilization, on the 
grounds of status of women and race. 1932E1 considers Halis’ victory more than a success of a Turk-
ish girl in a beauty competition, but “as a symbol of the new freedom which Turkish women have 
won, and a proof to the world that Turkey has finally shaken off the shackles which kept her so long 
from taking her place among civilized nations”. Similarly, 1932G2 discusses how, in less than a dec-
ade, the status of women in Turkey was elevated from a mere pariah imprisoned at home to an equal 
citizen with the right to become lawyers, judges, or police officers, and that with Halis’ victory, “the 
veil is lifted and taken away from the [Turkish] woman forever”. 1932E2 however opposes this view 
and claims that despite the Republican reforms to modernize the society, the Turkish public still pre-
fers Harem to modern life.  
The Turkish texts emphasize that Halis’ victory accelerated Turkey’s civilizational shift towards the 
West, mainly by undermining established European biases against Turkish women. 1932T1 and 
1932T3 note that Europeans continue to associated Turkish women with the Ottoman Harem, and 
the Republican reforms and the close relations with Europe only made a limited impact in correcting 
these biases. Halis’ victory is presented as a crucial evidence for the Republican reforms equating 
Turkish women with European women in terms of rights and liberties (1932T1; 1932T3; 1932T4).  
The Turkish texts also concur that the photos of Halis symbolizing the modern Turkish woman pro-
vided prestige to Turkey on a global scale.  
References to race are notably prevalent in both European and Turkish texts. 1932F2 implicitly in-
cludes Turkey within the category of “white race” while noting that black and yellow races cannot 
compete in a miss universe beauty contest. 1932T4 depicts Halis as “an epic poem of the Turkish 
race”, while 1932T3 claims that the victory of a Turkish woman of great virtue and skill proves “the 
nobility of the Turkish race”.  
 
3.4. The Twelfth Congress of the International Alliance of Women in Is-
tanbul (18-25 April 1935)    
Turkey had officially granted women the right to elect and be elected in the general elections on 5 
December 1934, prior to most European states. Shortly after, the Twelfth Congress of the Interna-
tional Alliance of Women was convened in Istanbul between 18-25 April 1935. Marking the first time 
that a women’s congress was held in Turkey, the event attracted much attention from Europe and 
was utilized by the Turkish government for prestige. Yet, shortly after the congress, the Turkish gov-
ernment decided to close down the Union of Turkish Women (Arat 1994; Libal 2008).  
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The international women’s congress in Istanbul triggered intensive debates in Turkish and European 
media on the status of women in both Turkish and European societies. 1935E1 highlights the rights 
and liberties acquired by Turkish women in the Republican era comparable to their Western coun-
terparts and therefore believes that it is fitting for women of the world to meet and discuss the prob-
lems of 1935 in Istanbul. Similarly, 1935E2 stresses the British representative Lady Astor’s apprecia-
tion of Ataturk’s understanding of women’s crucial role in Turkey which led him to grant Turkish 
women “equality in all natural rights”. 1935E5 stresses that the Republic enabled Turkish women to 
be “everywhere – banks, engineering shops, post offices, aviation” and even compelled business 
enterprises to hire a fixed percentage of girls. While all European texts favorably compare the Repub-
lic of Turkey to Ottoman Empire on the status of Turkish women, intriguingly, 1935G1 argues that 
women had already an equal position in the Turkish community before Islam, and concludes that the 
liberation of the Turkish woman is a return to a situation that had already existed in pre-Islamic 
times.  
Similarly, the European texts highlight Turkey’s rising prestige in international arena thanks to the 
rapid reforms ensuring the equality of women and men. Turkey is favorably compared to European 
states. 1935F2 stresses that Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, the wife of the US President Franklin D. Roose-
velt, sent a letter to the congress congratulating Ataturk’s efforts for the emancipation of Turkish 
women. 1935F3 too implicitly recognizes Turkey’s rising international prestige when it states “no 
wonder why the congress is chosen to take place in Turkey, a land where feminism prevails so rapid-
ly”. 1935G1 claims that the Turkish woman has surpassed “not only the French and Swiss, but also 
the English woman” with regards to the promotion of gender equality. 1935E3 claims that the re-
forms on women rights enables Turkey to help the East catch up with a declining West.    
The Turkish texts also note the rising international prestige of Turkey in comparison to Europe. 
1935T2 emphasizes that Turkish women are admired and envied by other women thanks to the 
rights and liberties granted by the Republic. 1935T3 claims that Turkey is constantly rising through its 
own initiatives, while such a linear progress is not observed in the rest of the world. 1935T3 also be-
lieves that the women congress in Istanbul is a source of prestige for Turkey enabling Turks to better 
inform foreigners about Turkish progress.   
 
3.5. Montreux International Straits Convention (20 July 1936)    
Having won its independence with the Lausanne Treaty (1923), Turkey however could not regain full 
control over the Straits as their administration was transferred to an international committee under 
the League of Nations. Threatened by the rising German and Italian revisionism in the 1930s, Turkey 
applied to the League to reclaim its sovereignty over the Straits. Turkey’s attachment to the diplo-
matic resolution of the issue was welcomed by European states (Britain, France and the Soviet Union 
in particular) that supported the Turkish quest.  
Regarding “civilization”, some European texts (1936E1, 1936E4, 1936F1, 1936F2) situate Turkey and 
Europe in different, but co-existing civilizations. The others (1936E2, 1936E3, 1936F3, 1936F4), on 
the other hand, do not explicitly differentiate between civilizations. 1936E3, for instance, uses the 
phrase “humanity that calls out for peace”, and praises Turkey’s adoption of peaceful method.  The 
Turkish texts emphasize Turkey’s acquisition of a Western/European status through pro-Western 
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reforms, and show the Montreux Convention as a solid evidence for Turkey’s European credentials. 
The straits are viewed as “a very significant foothold that ties Turkey to Europe and incorporates the 
reformist Turkish Republic into the family of European nations” (1936T2). Therefore, regaining its 
sovereign over the straits would mean that Turkey would become “the new magnificent state of Eu-
rope” (1936T1).      
Regarding the “status in international society” focal issue, the European texts argue that the straits 
provides Turkey with security along with economic and political leverage against other states 
(1936E4). Besides, Turkey’s insistence on the peaceful resolution of the dispute helps Turkey gain the 
sympathy and friendship of European states and thus sets an example for the resolution of all inter-
national disputes (1936E1, 1936F3, 1936F4). Moreover, 1936F3 and 1936E1 implicitly hint the declin-
ing status of Europe as it is filled with crisis and conflict. The Turkish texts too emphasize the rising 
status of Turkey through the Montreux convention. 1936T1 and 1936T2 argue that the resolution of 
the straits problem in Turkey’s favour contributed to its elevation to a leading actor status in the 
Near East and the Mediterranean. 1936T2 also highlights that Turkey has proved to be the guardian 
of peace. 1936T3, on the other hand, explicitly considers Europe as a declining actor due to the rising 
revisionist powers and the atrocities in the Spanish civil war. On the contrary, 1936T4 indicates that 
Europe remains a leading actor through its advance culture and science. 
 
3.6. Anschluss (12 March 1938) 
“Anschluss” (Union) refers to the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in 12 March 1938. Irreden-
tism through a nationalist and populist agenda to unite with kinsmen constituted the backbone of 
the aggressive foreign policy of Nazi Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler.  
 “Nationalism” is the most common focal issue highlighted in the Turkish texts. Acquisition of foreign 
territories is justified as the unification of brothers and sisters. 1938T2 argues that it is the “century 
of nationalism”; hence it is quite normal for two German nations to be united. The text deems the 
unification of Germany and Austria even much more understandable than the incorporation of Al-
sace-Lorraine to France although its inhabitants are overwhelmingly German. Similarly, 1938T3 con-
siders it reasonable for Germany to not only invade Austria, but also acquire Czechoslovakia where 
3.5 million Germans live. 1938T4 asserts that it was a matter of time before the two states, Germany 
and Austria, sharing the same race, language and culture eventually unite as one.    
Nationalism is implicitly depicted as a dividing factor in Europe, as it unites Germans, it also separates 
them from Europe. 1938T3, for instance, argues that Europe admits the loss of Austria to Germany 
and it hence concentrates its energy on Czechoslovakia so that it does not share the same fate. Simi-
larly, 1938T4 claims that Anschluss is the evidence of the overgrowth of Germans at the expense of 
Europe.  
Overall, the Turkish representation of Europe is highly critical since it is predicated as “weak”, “divid-
ed” and “prone to conflict”. There is a common agreement in the Turkish texts that Europe is in a 
serious decline facing the threat of “destruction”. Anschluss is represented in the Turkish texts as a 
crucial indicator of division within Europe where German irredentism severely threatens the Europe-
an balance of power.  
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4. Conclusion 
The analysis above demonstrates the ways in which mutual identity representations in Turkey and 
Europe have been contested in history within both settings, across different time periods, and in 
relation to the different focal issues which arose in the context of key political and cultural drivers. 
Hence it attests to the fluidity in identity representations on both sides, and underlines the need to 
be wary of reductionist interpretations which reads the historical relationship between Turkey and 
Europe as one of strict Othering that denotes exclusion, mainly on cultural and religious grounds.  
The first period has shown the prevalence of the four focal issues, yet at varying intensity in different 
times. For instance, civilization and state-society relations are observed to be key identity markers in 
both the coverage of the Tanzimat Edict and the Reform Edict. Nonetheless, it is after the Reform 
Edict that a more differentiated representation of identities over the focal issue of civilization seems 
to occur. Particularly in the Ottoman context, tensions begin to emerge (and intensifies at times in 
later periods) between the notion of European civilization and Ottoman traditions. In the case of 
European identity representations, a much more essentialist and exclusionary reading of European 
civilization vis-à-vis the Ottomans rises after the Hamidian massacres. This suggests that as political 
and cultural relations intensify between the two sides, this can trigger contestations over identity 
representations through key focal issues, such as civilization. Again, in empirical terms, the analysis 
finds that status (of Ottoman Empire) in international society emerges as a focal issue after the Re-
form Edict and the rise of Russia as a common enemy of both sides, and introduces the long-lasting 
tension in Ottoman Empire (and in later decades, the Turkish Republic) between the emulation of 
European standards and the threat posed by European intervention to Turkish national sovereignty.  
As can be expected, the rise of nationalism as a focal issue is much more pronounced in the second 
period of analysis, which corresponds with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the events 
leading up to the Second World War in Europe. For the Turkish side in this period, there is one civili-
zation that needs to be emulated in its totality, and that is the one of Europe. There is, however, 
more contestation in the European context where tensions can be observed between the percep-
tions of Oriental civilization and European civilization. Nonetheless, when it comes to status (of Tur-
key) in international society, this is clearly a focal issue where positive representations are on the rise 
in both contexts. The concept of race bridges identity representations towards the end of the 1930s, 
whereas the rise of nationalism leads for the first time to the negative perception of Europe as a 
weak and dissolving actor by the Ottoman side.       
In conceptual terms, it is apparent that difference, as expected in any process of identity construc-
tion, is a constant theme in mutual identity representations across Turkey and Europe. Except for 
Turkish representations in the second period in which Turkey’s Europeanness is underlined in parallel 
to the Europeanising/Westernising reforms of Ataturk, both parties denote each other as different to 
their own Selves. Yet, the both the ‘content’ and the ‘hierarchy’ entailed in this difference can vary 
enormously across time and space. This is visible in the identity representations evoked in relation to 
each focal issue in question.  
Nationalism, for instance, which emerges as a focal issue only towards the end of the first period of 
analysis, can be considered as a conceptual lens through which Turkey is seen in Europe as closer to 
the European Self in the ‘content’ of its identity (‘white race’) and as an equal of Europe in the sec-
ond period due to the increasing primacy of ‘race’ in defining the concept. In the Ottoman context, 
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however, the rise of nationalism in Europe in the second period leads to increasing negative percep-
tions of the European Other as weaker and as inferior to the Turkish Self, as demonstrated in the 
Turkish coverage of the Anchluss. In the Turkish context, although seeking status in international 
society through relations with Europe seems to be present in both periods, in the first period this 
seems to be limited to certain actors (i.e. Young Ottomans) and without a claim to Europeanness, 
unlike in the second period where international status is equated with the recognition of the claim to 
Europeanness.        
The contestation is even more visible when it comes to civilization. Contrary to widespread assump-
tions, it is observed that civilizational differences has not been systematically employed in history to 
denote strict Otherings between Turkey and Europe. In early 19th century, Ottomans view civilization 
as a concept that unites them with Europe, while in Europe, civilization is considered culturally trans-
ferrable. Cultural interaction and political alliance between the Ottomans and European powers in 
mid 19th century lead to the perception in Europe that Ottoman Empire is civilizing if not already 
civilized. Cultural events in this period, such as Sultan Abdülaziz’s visit to Europe as well as those in 
the second period, such as Keriman Halis’ victory in Miss. Universe, even seem to evoke a sense of 
civilizational closeness in Europe with the Ottoman Empire/Turkey.  
Yet, as the identity representations over the focal issue of civilization shows, there is a contestation 
that takes place within the Ottoman and European contexts where one form of identity representa-
tion may not dominate at a given time, even on a specific focal issue. In the Ottoman context, a two-
axis tension seems to exist between civilization embodied in European standards and Ottoman tradi-
tions, as well as the one between civilization and loss of sovereignty/threat of intervention (triggered 
by debates on state-citizen relations in developments such as the Cretan insurrection). Both of these 
axes can lead to representations of Europe as a potential destabilizer to the Ottoman/Turkish Self 
either on cultural and religious grounds and/or because of political/territorial concerns. Towards the 
end of the 19th century, atrocities toward non-Muslims trigger perceptions in Europe of Ottomans as 
barbaric; yet the belief that Ottomans can join civilization (under the right leadership) persists. On 
the other hand, Ottomans perceive their own behavior as civilized and accuse the Europeans of be-
traying civilization by defending solely the cause of Christians. Elite conflict continues to fuel con-
tending perspectives on Europe. With the establishment of modern republic of Turkey in 1923, Euro-
pean representations begin to situate Turkey in a distinct civilization, while commending its success 
in adopting aspects of the Western civilization. The status of women is flagged as a key indicator of 
Turkey’s advancement in civilization, moving even ahead of Western states.  Differences among Eu-
ropean states’ attitudes toward the Turkish reform process become more noticeable in the early 
20th century. For example, while the French and Germans consider the abolition of the Caliphate and 
Alphabet reform as great achievement, the British emphasize the costs and question the sustainabil-
ity of such radical reforms. Turkish sources in this period recognize the Western civilization as the 
only civilization, and portray the cultural reforms as evidence that Turkey is on its way to quickly join 
the Western civilization.    
In the 19th century, the focal issues of civilization and status in international society are often con-
flated in Ottoman and European representations. For Ottomans, conforming to standards of civiliza-
tion ensures a position in the European states system and facilitates cooperation between the Otto-
mans and various groupings of European states against external (in case of Crimean war) and internal 
(in case of Cretan insurrection) threats. Hence, identity-based concerns about civilizational belonging 
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and status in international society are tightly interwoven with strategic concerns about security. At 
times, when Ottoman security is not well served by cooperation with European states, internal de-
bates about the suitability and risks of European civilizational intrusion become paramount. In the 
early 20th century, security concerns take a back seat and status in international society is valued for 
its own sake. 
During times of cooperation, European states portray the Ottomans as an equal partner and capable 
of joining European civilization.  In the 1930s and 40s, Europe begins to be perceived as losing status 
in international society both in Europe and in Turkey. This perception promotes positive representa-
tions of Turkey in Europe.  
In the 19th century, reforms in state-citizen relations (mainly in the context of non-Muslim minori-
ties) in the Ottoman Empire are taken by Europe as an important sign of civilizational progress. Vio-
lence toward minorities, on the other hand, provide occasions for very negative identity representa-
tions, reproducing the Muslim/Christian divide. On the Ottoman side, they function as a double-
edged sword in terms of representations of Europe. Some part of the Ottoman elite attribute Otto-
man decline to poor governance, and represent European state-citizen relations as a model for Ot-
toman progress. Others present European interventionism on state-citizen relations as a threat to 
Ottoman integrity and security. The link between Europe and state-citizen relations varies among 
different factions of the Ottoman elite depending on the identity project they pursue (Ottomanism, 
nationalism, and Islamism). In the republican era, state-society relations persist in European repre-
sentations of modern Turkey, in the form of criticisms of the authoritarian and forceful imposition of 
cultural reforms.  
In relating these results to the future, it should be emphasized that there is no linear pattern to iden-
tity representations in both the Turkish and European contexts. Hence a linear pattern should also 
not be expected in future representations of Turkish and European identities. Instead, one could 
expect a set of identity representations being recycled in response to different cases and situations. 
Certain positive and negative events can be expected to trigger existing identity representations in 
novel ways, feeding into a set of future relations which can be identified by conflict, convergence or 
cooperation. For instance, while Sultan Abdülaziz’s visit to Europe triggered representations leading 
to convergence and the Reform Edict to cooperation, the Hamidian massacres were a clear case in 
which a key political driver has fueled identity representations conducive to conflict. The analysis of 
the third and the fourth periods in the following papers will give us a clearer picture of the sets of 
identity representations that have and that do still exist between the two sides. Furthermore, it will 
allow us to observe more closely whether and if so, the extent, to which there has been a conver-
gence or divergence between different European actors concerning the ways in which they represent 
Turkish/European identities in response to the major political and cultural drivers in the following 
periods.         
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